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NOT MY BROTHER’S KEEPER
ACCOUNTING FIRMS FACE INCREASED
SECURITIES CLAIMS FOR AUDITS
PERFORMED BY AFFILIATES IN OTHER
COUNTRIES
BRYAN J. HALL†
INTRODUCTION
Call it “Enron” with an Italian accent. On Christmas Eve
2003, Parmalat, the world’s largest dairy producer and Italy’s
eighth largest public company, declared bankruptcy in the wake
of a massive corporate fraud.1 Parmalat’s Chief Executive and
Chief Financial Officer admitted to cooking the books, and
investigators discovered that as much as $12 billion in assets,
including a $4.9 billion bank account, simply did not exist.2
Parmalat’s bankruptcy, coming just two years after the
spectacular collapse of Enron3 and the bankruptcy of WorldCom,4

†
Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Baruch College. I would like to thank
Cheryl L. Wade, the Dean Harold F. McNiece Professor of Law at St. John’s
University School of Law, for her suggestions and input to this Note. Additionally, I
would like to acknowledge and thank my family for their unending love and support.
1
See STEWART HAMILTON & ALICIA MICKLETHWAIT, GREED AND CORPORATE
FAILURE: THE LESSONS from RECENT DISASTERS 153 (2006); Peter Gumbel, How It
Went Sour, TIME, Dec. 13, 2004, at A2, available at http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1009674,00.html; Gail Edmonson, David Fairlamb &
Nanette Byrnes, The Milk Just Keeps on Spilling at Parmalat, BUS. WK., Jan. 26,
2004, at 54, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
04_04/b3867074_mz054.htm.
2
See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 163–65; Gail Edmondson &
Laura Cohn, How Parmalat Went Sour, BUS. WK., Jan. 12, 2004, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_02/b3865053_mz054.htm;
Edmonson, Fairlamb & Byrnes, supra note 1.
3
On December 2, 2001, Enron declared what was then the largest corporate
bankruptcy in history, bringing an end to what had been a $60 billion company just
one year earlier. See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 33–34, 46.
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shattered the view that Europe might escape America’s
accounting scandals.5 As had happened in the wake of Enron
and WorldCom, the focus in the Parmalat investigation turned
immediately to its outside auditors, two of the biggest names in
accounting, Deloitte & Touche and Grant Thornton.6 Local
partners of Grant Thornton were arrested, and Deloitte-Italy was
Grant Thornton International
placed under investigation.7
expelled its Italian member firm.8 And investors filed a civil suit
against the auditors, claiming billions of dollars in losses.9
The investors’ lawsuit took a novel approach. They alleged
that Parmalat’s Italian auditors, Deloitte & Touche S.p.A. and
Grant Thornton S.p.A., committed primary violations of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193410 by either
participating in or acquiescing in Parmalat’s fraud.11 Section
10(b), the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of

4
On July 21, 2002, WorldCom succeeded Enron as the largest corporate
bankruptcy in history, having reported nearly $11 billion in nonexistent income. See
HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 59, 72.
5
See Corporate Scandals: Déjà Vu All Over Again?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2003,
at 73. U.S. corporate governance was once viewed as the “gold standard,” Roger
Leeds, Breach of Trust: Leadership in a Market Economy, 25 HARV. INT’L REV. 76, 79
(2003), available at http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1164, but its
luster had, in fact, faded years before the Enron scandal. See Corporate Scandals:
Déjà Vu All Over Again?, supra. By contrast, in Europe there were “claims that
corporate governance [had] been improving” until Parmalat unfolded. Id.
6
See Joseph Weber & Gail Edmondson, Auditors Asleep at the Wheel. Sound
Familiar?, BUS. WK., Jan. 12, 2004, at 47, available at http://www.businessweek.
com/magazine/content/04_02/b3865055_mz054.htm.
7
See Edmonson, Fairlamb & Byrnes, supra note 1.
8
See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 640 F. Supp. 2d 243, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
9
See Third Amended Consol. Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Fed.
Sec. Laws at ¶ 62, In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(No. 04 MD 1653(LAK)). The investors sued Parmalat’s current Italian auditors,
Deloitte & Touche S.p.A., as well as the global accounting network that it belongs to,
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (“DTT” or “the global firm”). See In re Parmalat Sec.
Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Along with DTT, the investors sued
Deloitte & Touche LLP, DTT’s U.S. member firm. See id. at 446–47. These entities
are collectively referred to as “the Deloitte Defendants” in this Note. Along with
Deloitte, investors sued Parmalat’s former Italian auditors, Grant Thornton S.p.A.,
and the global accounting firm it belonged to, Grant Thornton International (“GTI”).
See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 245–46. Grant Thornton S.p.A. was subsequently
expelled from GTI for its role in the Parmalat audit. See id. at 252. Together with
GTI, the investors sued the U.S. member firm, Grant Thornton LLP. See id. at 245–
46. These entities are collectively referred to as “the Grant Thornton Defendants.”
10
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
11
See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 245–48; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 446–
48.
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1934, prohibits the knowing use of a manipulative or deceptive
document or other device in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities.12 The investors sued not only Parmalat’s Italian
auditors but also the global accounting firms they belonged to
and the U.S. member firms of each of these global accounting
firms.13 In this way, the investors were able to reach the deeppocketed U.S. accounting firm by means of a “stepping stone”
approach.14 The investors first alleged that the global accounting
firms controlled the Italian auditors and were, therefore,
vicariously liable for the Italians’ bad acts.15 Next, the investors
claimed that the U.S. accounting firms, by virtue of their size and
financial resources, controlled the global firms and should be
secondarily liable for the misdeeds of the Italian auditors.16
In early 2009, the U.S. district court in Parmalat ruled that
the global accounting firms can be held vicariously liable for the
Italian auditors’ primary violations of section 10(b) under the
common law theory of agency, which requires only a right to
control, not actual control, of the alleged wrongdoer.17 The court
also found that the investors could sue the global accounting
firms under section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,18 which imposes liability on a party that controls anyone
who commits a primary violation of the Act.19 Section 20(a) is
distinguishable from section 10(b) in that 20(a) provides an
affirmative defense if the control defendant acted in good faith
12

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance.”).
13
See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 245 (discussing the claims against the Grant
Thornton Defendants); Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (discussing various claims
against the Deloitte Defendants); see also infra Part II.B.
14
See James Roberts & Andrew Forsyth, The Risks of Globalisation, LEGAL WK.,
Sept. 17, 2009, at 26, available at http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/
1533842/professional-negligence-the-risks-globalisation.
15
See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 245–52; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 447,
451–59.
16
See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 252–54; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 458–
60.
17
See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 246–52; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 451–
55.
18
See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 255; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 455–56.
19
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006). The statute provides that “[e]very person who,
directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this
chapter . . . is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action.” Id.
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and did not directly or indirectly induce the violation.20 Turning
to the U.S. accounting firms, the court found that they could be
subject to secondary liability for controlling the global firms,
which, in turn, controlled the Italian auditors.21
This Note argues that plaintiffs who sue a global accounting
firm or a U.S. accounting firm for an audit performed by an
affiliated accounting firm should be required to prove that the
global or U.S. firm actually controlled the audit at issue in the
litigation.22 Plaintiffs should not be permitted to bypass the
express statutory limitations that Congress has placed on
secondary liability in the Securities Exchange Act by applying
broader common law principles of vicarious liability. The use of
common law vicarious liability in section 10(b) litigation conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent, which has taken a narrow view
of liability under 10(b), particularly given that Congress has
limited secondary liability by including a good faith defense in
section 20(a). Furthermore, this Note argues that public policy
considerations and organizational factors caution against

20

See id.; see also infra Part III.B.1.
See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 252–55; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 458–
60. While the Parmalat Court accepted plaintiffs’ securities fraud claims premised
on agency liability, it rejected claims that the U.S. auditors should be held liable as
the alter ego of their Italian counterparts because plaintiffs failed to allege a lack of
corporate formalities, intermingling of funds, common leadership, or domination by
the U.S. firms of their counterparts. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d
278, 296–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). To establish a claim of alter ego, plaintiffs must show
“complete domination of the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked,
and . . . that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the
plaintiff which resulted in plaintiff’s injury.” In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 454 F.
Supp. 2d 187, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The Parmalat plaintiffs appear not to have pursued a claim of enterprise liability,
which “provides a horizontal form of liability” to hold the various subsidiaries of a
business enterprise jointly liable. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing,
26 J. CORP. L. 479, 526 (2001); see Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 1
Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that “under the single-enterprise
rule, liability can be found between sister companies”). This may have been due to
“[t]he recurrent rejection of traditional enterprise liability by some [courts].” Alfred
F. Conard, Enterprise Liability and Insider Trading, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 913,
928 (1992).
22
This Note addresses claims against accounting firms based on vicarious or
secondary liability when the accounting firms did not conduct or actually control the
audit at issue in the litigation. Accounting firms can be held liable for their own
primary violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provided that all the
elements of the cause of action are met. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994); infra note 63.
21
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imposing secondary liability on independent, but affiliated,
accounting firms, absent a showing of actual control of the audit
at issue in the litigation.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the
development of the modern global structure of accounting firms
and analyzes recent district court decisions in which accounting
firms have not been held liable for audits performed by affiliated
accounting firms. Part I also considers the implications of three
Supreme Court decisions that rejected secondary liability under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Part II explores the
facts leading up to Parmalat’s bankruptcy and the district court’s
decision to apply agency and control liability to global and U.S.
accounting firms. Part III argues that the court in Parmalat
erred in applying common law agency liability to accounting
firms under section 10(b) for the actions of legally separate
affiliated firms. Rather, the court should have applied the
secondary liability provision that Congress expressly provided in
section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. Turning to section
20(a), Part III argues that the more rigorous actual control of the
audit standard should apply to secondary liability claims against
accounting firms, rather than the less rigorous power to control
standard. Finally, Part III applies the actual control of the audit
standard to the facts of Parmalat and demonstrates how, under
this standard, public policy and organizational considerations are
adequately addressed, while providing for meaningful recovery
against accounting firms that actually control the audit at issue
in the litigation.
I.
A.

MEGA FIRMS AND MASSIVE LIABILITY

A Nontraditional Global Structure

From the outside, accounting firms look like any modern
international corporation, with global headquarters and branches
in different countries. But despite their efforts to present a
uniform global brand, accounting firms are actually associations
of distinct national partnerships, and the individual national
firms have limited involvement in and, presumably, liability for
the actions of their affiliates in other countries.23 This unique

23

THE

See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE AUDITING PROFESSION, FINAL REPORT OF
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE AUDITING PROFESSION TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT
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structure has developed out of a need to meet the demands of
large global clients, while adhering to national laws on
ownership and practice, which vary greatly by state and
country.24
From fairly modest beginnings as small partnerships of
practitioners, accounting firms grew rapidly in the second half of
the twentieth century to match the size and scale of their
multinational corporate clients.25 As they expanded globally,
accounting firms retained their traditional partnership structure
because this structure is often mandated by law26 in part to
ensure that junior accountants develop their practical experience
and professional judgment by working alongside more seasoned
professionals.27 In the United States, many states continue to
require that licensed public accountants own a majority stake in
any accounting practice licensed to do business in the state.28
Similarly, many foreign countries impose partnership structures
on accounting firms or prohibit foreign-owned firms from

OF THE TREASURY V:10–11 (2008) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT],
available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/acap/docs/final-report.pdf.
Then-Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., commissioned the report to
examine the current state of the auditing profession and to develop
recommendations for making the profession more sustainable. See id. at I:1. The
Advisory Committee could not agree on changes to private securities litigation
involving accounting firms, but it did recommend that the firms provide greater
information to the public. See id. at II:8–9.
24
See id. at V:10.
25
See id. at V:4–5, V:10; GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A
HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
ACCOUNTING 298–301, 348–49 (1998).
26
See UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AUDITS OF
PUBLIC COMPANIES 7–9 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08163.pdf. The Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) prepared this report as part of an ongoing initiative to assist Congress in
examining the highly concentrated market for public company audits. See id. at 2.
Although audit market concentration may limit a company’s choice in selecting an
auditor, the GAO found “no compelling need” for Congress to act. See id. at 4–6.
27
See DAVID GRAYSON ALLEN & KATHLEEN MCDERMOTT, ACCOUNTING FOR
SUCCESS: A HISTORY OF PRICE WATERHOUSE IN AMERICA 1890–1990, at 7–8 (1993);
PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 25, at 201–02.
28
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:10; CENTER FOR
AUDIT QUALITY, REPORT OF THE MAJOR PUBLIC COMPANY AUDIT FIRMS TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE AUDITING
PROFESSION 23 n.5 (2008) [hereinafter CENTER FOR AUDIT QUALITY], available at
http://www.thecaq.org/publicpolicy/data/TRData2008-01-23-FullReport.pdf
(“state
laws require audit firms to be owned to a substantial degree by CPAs”).
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operating within their borders.29 These ownership laws have
prevented the development of global accounting corporations,
and, as a result, today all global accounting firms operate as
networks of nationally owned partnerships.30
Within this network structure, accounting firms remain
legally separate and distinct entities.31 The primary relationship
between the various national partnerships is their membership
in the global accounting network, or global firm.32 Under the
umbrella of the global firm, the national accounting firms share a
common brand name and apply common standards and
procedures established by the global firm.33 The global firm does
not perform audits but sets the standards and procedures that its
member firms apply, monitors compliance with those standards
and procedures, and coordinates activities at a global level.34
Because their role is primarily that of a standard setter and
caretaker of the brand name, these global firms are typically
organized as limited liability, nonprofit entities.35

29
See Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, Nos. 00 Civ. 2284(DLC), 00 Civ. 2498(DLC),
2002 WL 826847, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2002) (acknowledging accounting firm’s
argument that “the laws of many nations in which its member firms operate prohibit
the operation of foreign accounting firms”); ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 23, at V:10.
30
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:10 (“[T]he
development of [accounting] networks grew out of a need to comply with countryspecific regulations, which . . . mandate that auditing firms be controlled and owned
by locally licensed professionals.”).
31
See id. at V:13–14.
32
See id. at V:14.
33
See id. at V:10.
34
See id. at V:14–15. While setting standards, monitoring compliance, and
coordinating global activities are strong evidence of control, courts have generally
found them to be insufficient to establish liability against global accounting firms.
See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
35
See CENTER FOR AUDIT QUALITY, supra note 28, at 5–21 (discussing the
organizational structures of the six largest global accounting networks). BDO
International is incorporated in the Netherlands as BDO Global Coordination B.V.
Id. at 5. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu has been established as a verein under Swiss
law. Id. at 8. In German, “ ‘Verein’ means association, society, club or union.” In re
Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting CASSEL’S
GERMAN DICTIONARY 662 (1978)). Ernst & Young Global Limited is a private
company limited by guarantee under United Kingdom law. CENTER FOR AUDIT
QUALITY, supra note 28, at 12. Grant Thornton International Ltd. is a private
company limited by guarantee in England and Wales. Id. at 15. KPMG International
operates as a Swiss cooperative. Id. at 19. Lastly, PricewaterhouseCoopers
International Limited is an English private company limited by guarantee. Id. at 21.
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This global network structure enables modern accounting
firms to achieve several important organizational and business
objectives. First, the network structure has, until recently,
insulated the national member firms from liability for one
another’s alleged wrongdoing.36 Second, nationally oriented
accounting firms are better able to understand and comply with
national standards on accounting, auditing, independence, and
education.37 Third, a coordinated approach enables national
firms to operate on a global scale by sharing resources to service
multinational clients under a common, recognized brand name.38
Fourth, by applying international standards and procedures, the
firms ensure a consistent quality of work globally.39
Although this global network structure has many
advantages, it has one significant disadvantage: Accounting
firms have had to become very large to match the size of their
corporate clients, and this has resulted in the industry being
dominated by a handful of large global accounting firms. To
address the size and scale of many of their clients, accounting
firms consolidated during the 1980s and 1990s through a series
of “mega mergers.”40 By the end of the 1990s, the eight largest
accounting firms had consolidated through mergers into five
firms.41 With the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002 in the
wake of the Enron scandal,42 this number was reduced to just
four large global accounting firms.43 The four remaining mega

36

See infra Part I.C.
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at II:8, V:10 (“[T]o
effectively operate in foreign jurisdictions, auditing firms . . . need to employ
individuals familiar with the accounting, legal, cultural, linguistic, and business
practices of each relevant jurisdiction.”).
38
See id. at V:10.
39
See id.; see also International Federation of Accountants, Forum of Firms,
http://www.ifac.org/Forum_of_Firms/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2010) (discussing global
accounting firms’ role in promoting compliance with international standards by their
member firms).
40
See generally SAMUEL A. CYPERT, FOLLOWING THE MONEY: THE INSIDE STORY
OF ACCOUNTING’S FIRST MEGA-MERGER 189–222 (1991) (discussing the first mega
merger that created the global accounting firm now known as KPMG).
41
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:4–5; GAO REPORT,
supra note 26, at 8–9.
42
See infra Part I.D.
43
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:4–5; GAO REPORT,
supra note 26, at 75 (“[T]he overall market for public company audits continues to be
highly concentrated among the largest accounting firms.”).
37
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firms44 audit ninety-eight percent of the 1,500 largest public
companies in the United States,45 and ninety-four percent of all
audit fees paid by publicly listed U.S. companies are remitted to
these four accounting firms.46 While smaller and midsized
accounting firms continue to grow and pursue ever larger clients,
their share of the overall market for large public company audits
remains small.47 The highly concentrated nature of the audit
industry has already had a negative impact on auditor
independence, conflicts of interest, and the ability of public
companies to switch auditors.48 The loss of one of the four
remaining large global accounting firms to a massive civil
judgment from a suit like Parmalat would likely result in
inadequate choice and increased cost for companies, as well as
impaired auditor independence, all of which would greatly harm
both public companies and the investing public.49 Public policy,
therefore, strongly cautions against expanding accounting firm
liability at a time when the industry is highly concentrated and
extremely vulnerable to large tort judgments.
B.

“Public Watchdog” Accounting

Along with the rapid growth brought about by globalization,
one of the most important elements in the development of the
modern accounting industry was the requirement that all
publicly listed corporations undergo annual audits of their
financial statements.50 In the United States, this requirement
was introduced in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.51
44
The four largest global accounting networks are PricewaterhouseCoopers
International Ltd., Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young Global Ltd., and
KPMG International. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:10–12.
45
See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 4.
46
See id. at 75.
47
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:7; GAO REPORT, supra
note 26, at 15–18.
48
See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 21–24. Public companies today have fewer
choices in selecting an outside auditor because frequently only one or two of the
largest firms provides the breadth of services and has the industry expertise that the
client needs. See id. at 15–18.
49
See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 32–36.
50
See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 25, at 274 (“Passage [of the Securities
Exchange Act] increased demand for accounting services . . . . The legislation [also]
conferred upon CPAs a legally defined social obligation: to assist in creating and
sustaining investor confidence in the public capital markets.”).
51
See Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the
PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1145–46 (2007).
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Publicly traded companies listed on U.S. exchanges must file
annual reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) that have been certified by “independent public
accountants.”52 Corporations pay for their outside auditors to
conduct these audits, but the investing public is the ultimate
beneficiary of audited financial reports.53
By mandating regular audits of all public companies, the
Securities Exchange Act imposed a dual responsibility on
auditors: to advise and serve their clients and to protect the
public trust.54 This dual role has led to an “expectation gap,”
where shareholders expect auditors to “root out management
fraud,”55 whereas auditors view their role as “provid[ing]
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of
material misstatement.”56 However, when fraud is uncovered at
a public company, investors and the public, somewhat naturally,
ask why the auditors failed to detect it sooner.57 Beginning in the
1970s, the public’s expectation that auditors would root out fraud
led to a dramatic increase in litigation as plaintiffs and courts
came to view accounting firms as a “deep pocket” source for
recompensing aggrieved shareholders.58

52

See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01–.2-07 (2010).
See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 25, at 273–74. Following passage of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, “[r]egulators promoted audited financial
statements as the means by which stockholders could exercise their ownership
rights.” Id. at 274.
54
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s
financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility
transcending any employment relationship with the client. The
independent public accountant performing this special function owes
ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well
as to the investing public. This “public watchdog” function demands that
the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and
requires complete fidelity to the public trust.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817–18 (1984).
55
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at VII:14–15; THOMAS A.
KING, MORE THAN A NUMBERS GAME: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING 67 (2006).
See generally Marianne Ojo, Eliminating the Audit Expectations Gap: Myth or
Reality?, MUNICH PERSONAL REPEC ARCHIVE, Feb. 2006, http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/232/1/MPRA_paper_232.pdf.
56
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at VII:15.
57
See id. at VII:14–15.
58
See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 25, at 375–78 (“Accountants are popular
targets of the plaintiff’s bar, sometimes because of the notion that firms have the
resources (deep pockets) to reward the litigants.”).
53
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Accounting Scandals and the Search for Deep Pockets

In recent years, accounting firms have faced increased
liability for not detecting fraud or preventing financial
misstatements by their clients, resulting in billions of dollars in
settlements and judgments.59 Investors frequently react by suing
the corporation’s accounting firms for violations of the Securities
Exchange Act.60 While litigation has become a cost of doing
business for accounting firms,61 the primary risk to their longterm sustainability comes from the potential “big ticket” suit for
billions of dollars that could bankrupt a firm.62 This risk is
particularly acute in cases where the accounting firm does not
participate in or control the audit but is only affiliated with the
accounting firm that actually performed the audit.
1.

Section 10(b) and Secondary Liability

Plaintiffs frequently bring claims against auditors under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
prohibits the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.63 In a suit
against an accounting firm, plaintiffs typically claim that the
auditors knowingly or recklessly ignored fraud that was
perpetrated by company insiders, while issuing clean audit
59
See CENTER FOR AUDIT QUALITY, supra note 28, at 49 (stating that the six
largest U.S. accounting firms paid out $3.68 billion to settle lawsuits related to
public company audits between 1996 and 2007).
60
See infra Part I.C.1 for a discussion of claims under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange act. See infra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of claims under section
20(a).
61
See CENTER FOR AUDIT QUALITY, supra note 28, at 27–28. Total litigation
costs for the six largest U.S. accounting firms represented 15.1% of audit-related
revenues, the firms’ largest expense after employee and partner compensation and
client-related expenses. See id.
62
See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1642–44 (2006).
63
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). Pursuant to 10(b), the Securities and Exchange
Commission has promulgated Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). To establish
a violation of section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must show a material
misrepresentation or omission; scienter; a connection between the misrepresentation
and the purchase or sale of securities; reliance on the misrepresentation; economic
loss; and loss causation. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 157 (2008). In 2010, after the Parmalat decision was rendered, the Second
Circuit limited private suits under section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 against accountants and
other secondary actors to instances in which “false statements [are] attributed to the
secondary-actor defendant at the time of dissemination.” Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v.
Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2010).
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opinions of the company’s financial statements on which the
plaintiffs or the market relied.64 Section 10(b) did not establish
an express private cause of action; the cause of action was
judicially created.65 As a result, courts have struggled with the
precise contours of the private cause of action, particularly when
plaintiffs sue both primary violators and secondary parties who
have some relationship with the primary violator of 10(b).66
Adding to the complexity, in cases involving accounting firms,
plaintiffs and courts often conflate legally distinct entities by
using the common brand name to refer to all the defendants.67
Although federal district and appellate courts have generally
treated the 10(b) private cause of action as a broad remedy,68
most courts have rejected attempts to hold U.S. accounting firms
and global firms secondarily liable for the work of an affiliated
accounting firm in another country.69 This has frequently been
64

See, e.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 283–84 (S.D.N.Y.

2005).
65
The private cause of action under 10(b) was first recognized in Kardon v. Nat’l
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court
acknowledged its existence in a footnote in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
66
See In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 230 F. Supp. 2d 152, 172–73 (D.
Mass. 2002).
67
See Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 288–89 (stating that plaintiffs’ use of the
terms “Deloitte” and “Grant Thornton” to refer to multiple defendants was “illadvised”); Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, Nos. 00 Civ. 2284(DLC), 00 Civ. 2498(DLC),
2002 WL 826847, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2002). The Cromer Court denied summary
judgment for the global firm, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, in part because the audit
report was “signed ‘Deloitte & Touche,’ in a cursive signature.” Id. However,
“Deloitte & Touche” is not the global firm’s name; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu is. See
id. at *1. Deloitte’s member firm in Bermuda operated under the name “Deloitte &
Touche (Bermuda).” Id.
68
See Laperriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc. 526 F.3d 715, 725 & n.21 (11th Cir.
2008) (finding a seven-to-one split among the other federal courts of appeals in favor
of applying common law vicarious liability to section 10(b)). The Third Circuit has
generally limited secondary liability to section 20(a). See Sharp v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 182–83 (3d Cir. 1981); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d
880, 884–85 (3d Cir. 1975). Along with the Third Circuit, a number of district courts
have rejected vicarious liability claims brought under 10(b). See, e.g., In re
Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Mass. 1997); Converse, Inc. v.
Norwood Venture Corp., No. 96 CIV. 3745(HB), 1997 WL 742534, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 1, 1997); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp.
584, 612–13 (D.N.J. 1996).
69
See, e.g., Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., No. 09 Civ. 0118(VM), 2010 WL
3341636, at *71–73 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2010) (“[A]llegations of generalized control
are insufficient to state a plausible claim of coordinating-entity control over its
member firms in the auditing context.”); Nuevo Mundo Holdings v. Pricewaterhouse
Coopers LLP, No. 03 Civ. 0613 GBD, 2004 WL 112948, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22,
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due to the plaintiffs’ relatively weak factual arguments regarding
the relationship between the foreign audit firm that actually
performed the audit and the global or U.S. firm.70 Plaintiffs have
had some success with facts showing that the accounting firm
was actually involved in the particular audit71 or employed the
individual alleged to have committed the wrongdoing.72
Plaintiffs, however, have generally been unsuccessful in suing
global accounting firms based on a theory of vicarious liability
under section 10(b).73
In contrast with some lower courts, the Supreme Court has
consistently read section 10(b) quite narrowly, limiting the
private cause of action to the express language of the statute.74
On three occasions, the Court has refused to recognize secondary
liability under section 10(b).75 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
the Supreme Court rejected secondary liability premised on the
auditor’s alleged negligence in failing to properly audit a
brokerage fund, finding that the statute required, at a minimum,
recklessness by the defendant.76 The plaintiffs in Ernst & Ernst
claimed that the auditors had failed to conduct proper audits of
the company, which would have uncovered the wrongdoing at the

2004) (“[C]ourts have declined to treat different [accounting] firms as a single entity,
holding them liable for one another’s acts, simply because they shared an
associational name and/or collaborated on certain aspects of a transaction.”); In re
Asia Pulp & Paper Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re
WorldCom, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2003 WL 21488087, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003); Lernout & Hauspie, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 173; Howard v.
Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 661–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). But
see In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
70
See Nuevo Mundo Holdings, 2004 WL 112948, at *3; Asia Pulp, 293 F. Supp.
2d at 396; WorldCom, 2003 WL 21488087, at *10; Lernout & Hauspie, 230 F. Supp.
2d at 173.
71
See Cromer, 2002 WL 826847, at *2–3 (refusing to dismiss the complaint
because the global accounting firm’s name and logo were included on the audit
opinion, and the lead partner on the audit was a member of the global firm’s
leadership).
72
See Sharp, 649 F.2d at 182–83.
73
See supra note 69; In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 296–97
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting a claim of alter ego liability against the Deloitte
Defendants); Lernout & Hauspie, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 173 (rejecting a claim of agency
liability against a global accounting firm).
74
See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) (“[T]he text of the statute controls our decision.”).
75
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 552 U.S. at 158, 166–67; Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at
176–78; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206, 215 (1976).
76
See 425 U.S. at 190, 215.
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heart of the fraud.77 Plaintiffs conceded, however, that there was
no evidence that the auditors had intentionally participated in or
aided the fraud, claiming only that the failure to conduct a
proper audit was “inexcusable negligence.”78 Relying on the text
of section 10(b) and congressional intent, the Court concluded
that the private cause of action under 10(b) does not reach
“negligent wrongdoing,”79 limiting claims to defendants who
exhibit scienter.80 The Court, thus, refused to “broaden the class
of plaintiffs who may seek to impose liability upon
accountants . . . under the Acts.”81
The Court continued to apply its narrow construction of
section 10(b) in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., in which the Court rejected a claim of
secondary liability under 10(b) against a trustee for allegedly
aiding a fraud by bond issuers who had defaulted.82 Plaintiffs
sought to hold Central Bank liable for aiding and abetting83 the
fraud. Because Central Bank had been aware that the value of
the land used to secure the bonds had not appreciated in value as
predicted, it delayed conducting an independent appraisal and
the bond issuer defaulted.84 Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument
and overturning the decisions of nearly every circuit court to
consider the issue,85 the Supreme Court found that the language
of section 10(b) did not prohibit—or even address—aiding and
abetting a fraud,86 and the plaintiffs had failed to establish that
these defendants made a material misstatement or omission.87

77

See id. at 190.
Id. at 190 n.5.
79
Id. at 210.
80
See id. at 202 (“There is no indication . . . that § 10(b) was intended to
proscribe conduct not involving scienter.”).
81
Id. at 214 n.33.
82
511 U.S. 164, 176–78, 191 (1994).
83
As defined by the Tenth Circuit in the Central Bank litigation, aiding and
abetting liability required a primary violation of section 10(b), recklessness by the
aider and abettor as to the existence of the violation, and substantial assistance
given by the aider and abettor to the party that committed the 10(b) violation. See
id. at 168.
84
See id. at 167–68.
85
See id. at 194 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that nearly every circuit
had approved of some form of secondary liability for aiding and abetting under
section 10(b)).
86
See id. at 173 (majority opinion). The Court found that aiding and abetting
“reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all.” Id. at 176.
87
See id. at 177.
78
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The Court thus refused to read the judicially created private
cause of action more broadly than the statutory language.88
More recently, in 2008, the Court again rejected secondary
liability that had been packaged as “scheme liability”89 in
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc.90 The
Stoneridge plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, which were
customers and vendors of the company that had committed the
fraud, should be held liable for engaging in arrangements with
the company that made its financial position appear healthier
than it was.91 While acknowledging that the defendants’ actions
were “deceptive,”92 the Court concluded that plaintiffs had failed
to establish that they relied on the defendants’ deceptive acts.93
In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that “Section 10(b) does not
incorporate common-law fraud into federal law” and cautioned
against reading 10(b) broadly in the absence of direction from
Congress.94 The Court also noted that its decision in Central
Bank had resulted in calls for Congress to expand secondary
liability under 10(b) but that Congress had actually narrowed the
private cause of action when it enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).95 While Stoneridge did
not expressly disclaim all forms of secondary or vicarious liability

88

See id. at 180.
The Ninth Circuit, which until Stoneridge applied scheme liability, described
it as follows:
[T]he defendant must have engaged in conduct that had the principal
purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact in furtherance of
the scheme. It is not enough that a transaction in which a defendant was
involved had a deceptive purpose and effect; the defendant’s own conduct
contributing to the transaction or overall scheme must have had a
deceptive purpose and effect.
Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub
nom., Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 552 U.S. 1162
(2008).
90
See 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008).
91
See id. at 152–55.
92
Id. at 160.
93
See id.
94
Id. at 162–63.
95
See id. at 158 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006)). In enacting the PSLRA,
Congress directed the SEC to prosecute aiders and abettors, rather than permit
private suits. See id. Congress also imposed “heightened pleading requirements” on
suits under 10(b). See id. at 165.
89
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under 10(b), it reiterated that, to establish liability under 10(b),
“[t]he conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the
elements or preconditions for liability.”96
2.

Section 20(a): Expressly Providing for Secondary Liability

Given the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the 10(b)
private cause of action very narrowly, some plaintiffs have
sought to impose liability against global accounting firms under
section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.97 Section
20(a) imposes joint and several liability on any party that
directly or indirectly controls a party that commits a primary
violation of the Act.98 To establish liability under 20(a), plaintiffs
must show both a primary violation of the Act and control of the
violator by the defendant.99 Section 20(a) enables plaintiffs to
sue corporate officers, boards of directors, and majority
shareholders when they control an entity or an individual who
commits a securities violation.100 Unlike primary liability under
the Act, however, section 20(a) includes an affirmative defense
for control persons that can prove that they acted in good faith
and did not induce the underlying violation.101 Therefore, where
a primary violation and a control relationship are established,
the control person is presumed liable by virtue of its control,
unless it can establish good faith and an absence of inducement.
As with suits seeking to impose vicarious liability on
accounting firms, claims brought under section 20(a) seeking to
impose control person liability on affiliated accounting firms
have, until recently, been largely unsuccessful. In particular,
courts have rejected imposing control person liability on

96
Id. at 158 (emphasis added); see SEC v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d
342, 355 (D.N.J. 2009) (“From Central Bank to Stoneridge, the Supreme Court has
consistently narrowed the class of defendants reachable by the implied cause of
action under Section 10(b).”).
97
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006).
98
See id.
99
See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)).
100
See Loftus C. Carson, II, The Liability of Controlling Persons Under the
Federal Securities Acts, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 263, 278–81 (1997).
101
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). There is currently a split among the circuits and
within the Second Circuit as to whether the elements of good faith and inducement
are part of a plaintiff’s prima facie case or an affirmative defense. See infra Part
III.B.1.
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accounting firms based on membership in a global firm,102 a
common brand name,103 use of marketing materials that promote
a single firm identity,104 or the member firm’s representations
that it was acting as an agent of the global firm.105 Similarly,
courts have rejected claims that accounting firms should be
secondarily liable for the actions of their affiliates in
nonsecurities litigation.106
D. Arthur Andersen: A Cautionary Tale
No discussion of auditor liability would be complete without
mention of Arthur Andersen, the accounting firm that collapsed
following allegations of involvement in the fraudulent conduct by
the management of Enron and Andersen’s efforts to cover it up.
Founded by its namesake in 1913 and regarded as “a great and
venerable American brand,”107 Andersen ceased doing business
barely nine months after its largest client, Enron, filed for what
was then the largest corporate bankruptcy in history.108
Andersen would later be sued for its audit work for a number of
clients, including Enron,109 WorldCom,110 and Global Crossing.111
In many of these suits, plaintiffs alleged that the various
national accounting firms that operated under the Andersen

102
See In re WorldCom, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2003 WL
21488087, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003).
103
See Nuevo Mundo Holdings v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, No. 03 Civ.
0613 GBD, 2004 WL 112948, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004).
104
See In re Asia Pulp & Paper Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
105
See Star Energy Corp. v. RSM Top-Audit, No. 08 Civ. 00329(DC), 2008 WL
5110919, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2008).
106
See, e.g., Nuevo Mundo Holdings, 2004 WL 112948, at *3 (rejecting agency
claim in a suit for fraud and negligence); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick
Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 661–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting agency claim in
employment discrimination suit).
107
BARBARA LEY TOFFLER, FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED, AND THE
FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN 7 (Doubleday 2004) (2003).
108
See id. at 213. Andersen’s collapse was the result of a criminal indictment for
obstruction of justice, id. at 219, which arose from its shredding of “as many as 26
trunks and 24 boxes” of documents relating to its audits of Enron. Id. at 214.
109
See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “Erisa” Litig., Nos. MDL-1446,
Civ.A. H-01-3624, Civ.A. H-01-3913, 2003 WL 22962792, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5,
2003).
110
See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2003 WL
21488087, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003).
111
See In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 324 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
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name and the global firm they belonged to, Andersen Worldwide
Société Coopérative, should be held vicariously liable for the
actions of Arthur Andersen LLP, the U.S. accounting firm that
actually performed the audits.112 The courts, however, rejected
these secondary liability claims, focusing instead on the culpable
actions of Arthur Andersen LLP.113
Andersen’s demise resulted not only from its criminal
obstruction of justice conviction, which a unanimous Supreme
Court overturned three years later,114 but also from the loss of
confidence of its clients, partners, and employees.115 Andersen’s
partnership structure aided in its demise by inhibiting fast
decisionmaking in response to the Department of Justice’s
criminal investigation and indictment.116 In addition, Andersen’s
network structure enabled its member firms to break from the
U.S. firm in search of “new homes.”117
In the wake of Enron and Arthur Andersen, Congress acted
swiftly to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.118
This
legislation brought sweeping changes to the regulation of
accounting and financial reporting, including requiring CEOs
and CFOs of public companies to certify their financial
statements under civil and criminal penalty, imposing internal
control reviews of public companies, and establishing the Public

112

See Enron, 2003 WL 22962792, at *9; WorldCom, 2003 WL 21488087, at *9–

10.
113

See Enron, 2003 WL 22962792, at *9 (finding plaintiffs’ claims that the global
firm and its member firms were a single entity were “vague” and accepting a
settlement to resolve the litigation); WorldCom, 2003 WL 21488087, at *10 (rejecting
a claim of vicarious liability under 10(b) against the global firm because the
complaint lacked “specific allegations of a conveyance of actual authority” from the
global firm to Andersen-U.S.). In Global Crossing, the global firm did not move for
dismissal, for reasons not entirely clear, and the court did not address the issue. See
322 F. Supp. 2d 324–25 & n.2.
114
See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005). The
Supreme Court unanimously overturned Andersen’s conviction on the grounds that
the trial court’s jury instructions “failed to convey properly the elements of a
‘corrup[t] persua[sion]’ conviction” under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). Id. The Court found
that the trial judge had omitted the element of “dishonesty” from the jury charge on
corrupt persuasion, and that the judge had failed to explain that the jury must find
a nexus between the destruction of the documents and the government proceeding
that was being obstructed. See id. at 706–07.
115
See PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 179
(2002); TOFFLER, supra note 107, at 218–19, 223.
116
See TOFFLER, supra note 107, at 218–19, 247–48.
117
See Enron, 2003 WL 22962792, at *9.
118
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee the accounting
industry.119 Sarbanes-Oxley also sought to reduce or remove
conflicts of interest between corporations and their auditors.120
Congress, however, failed to take any steps to address the issues
of accounting firm liability and sustainability arising from
private securities litigation premised on vicarious or secondary
liability. The cautionary tale of Arthur Andersen highlights the
risks faced by global accounting firms, notably the “mass exodus”
of partners, staff, and clients.121 The tale of Andersen also
demonstrates the potential impact on the market, because the
loss of Andersen resulted in the remaining four global accounting
firms raising audit fees and forgoing clients due to inadequate
resources.122
II. PARMALAT: EUROPE’S ENRON
Not long after the Enron bankruptcy brought down Arthur
Andersen, the accounting industry in Europe was rocked by a
homegrown accounting scandal: Parmalat.
Investigations,
recriminations, and finger-pointing followed swiftly, as did a raft
of private securities litigation.123 U.S. investors who had lost
billions investing in Parmalat sued the company’s bankers,
advisors, and its current and former auditors.124 The plaintiffs
sought to impose liability on both the accounting firms that had
actually audited Parmalat—who were accused of complicity in its
fraud—and the global firms and U.S. accounting firms with

119
See John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21
J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 96–100 (2007), available at http://www.aeaweb.org/
articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.21.1.91.
120
See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE
21 (2006). For a detailed discussion of the changes brought about by the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley, see ROBERT R. MOELLER, SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE NEW
INTERNAL AUDITING RULES 9–58 (2004); GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 10–13. For
an in-depth critique of Sarbanes-Oxley, in particular, the incentives it created for
greater securities litigation, see BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra, at 38–81.
121
See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 9.
122
See id. at 18.
123
See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 640 F. Supp. 2d 243, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re
Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 446–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
124
See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 245; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
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which the Italian auditors were affiliated, claiming vicarious
liability under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.125
A.

From Rural Dairy to Global Scandal

Parmalat, a name now synonymous with corporate fraud,
began as a humble dairy in a small Italian town.126 Started in
1961 by Stefano Tanzi, Parmalat grew rapidly, expanding
internationally through massive borrowing.127 By 2003, Tanzi
had transformed Parmalat into the world’s largest dairy business
and Italy’s eighth largest company.128 But as Parmalat expanded
globally, a ticking time bomb lay at the center of the corporation:
false accounting and special purpose entities designed to conceal
Parmalat’s debt.129
Reminiscent of Enron, Parmalat’s star shone brightly until
the moment before it burned out.130 In the year before its
bankruptcy, Parmalat continued to receive favorable ratings
from stock analysts and credit rating agencies.131 As Parmalat
accumulated billions in off balance sheet debt, it reported record
sales and profits.132 But while its auditors signed off on the
financial statements, red flags began to appear.133 In January
2003, Parmalat’s stock fell forty percent below its market high,
and in May 2003, Parmalat withdrew a $360–600 million bond
offer due to a lack of interest.134 But business continued as usual
at Parmalat until November 10, 2003, when it announced that
the Italian securities regulator had asked the company to clarify
some of the accounting treatment used in its financial

125
See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 247, 255–56; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at
449–50.
126
See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 153–55.
127
See id. at 154–59.
128
See Gumbel, supra note 1.
129
See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 156–61.
130
For example, less than a year before it would be declared insolvent, Parmalat
was chosen to join the Italian stock exchange’s prestigious blue chip index, the
Mib30. See id. at 159.
131
See id. at 159–60.
132
See id. at 160.
133
See id. at 168.
134
See id. at 159.
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statements.135 With investors growing nervous and the media
asking questions, the house of cards collapsed as Parmalat failed
to make a bond repayment in early December.136 Trading in
Parmalat’s shares was suspended, and the Chairman and CFO
resigned.137 Parmalat declared bankruptcy on December 24,
2003, and three days later, the company was declared insolvent
when it was discovered that Parmalat’s purported $4.9 billion
bank account simply did not exist.138 The bankruptcy court
appointed a corporate turnaround specialist to be Parmalat’s
bankruptcy commissioner,139 and one of his first acts was to fire
Parmalat’s auditors.140
“Europe’s Enron” had the classic hallmarks of an accounting
scandal.141 Parmalat’s executives were accused of pulling off a
multi-billion dollar accounting scam and looting the company,142
while Parmalat’s Italian auditors, Deloitte & Touche S.p.A. and
Grant Thornton S.p.A., were accused of helping to create and
sustain the fraud.143 Not only had Parmalat’s auditors signed off
on its financial statements and its labyrinth of shell companies,
but Parmalat’s former group auditor, Grant Thornton S.p.A.,
stood accused of orchestrating the numerous offshore
subsidiaries that had helped Parmalat hide its debt.144 Deloitte
& Touche, Parmalat’s auditors at the time of its bankruptcy,
fared no better when it was revealed that a Deloitte affiliate in
Brazil, which had audited Parmalat’s Brazilian subsidiary, had
warned the global firm about Parmalat’s accounting in 2001 and
2002, but Deloitte-Brazil’s warnings went unheeded.145
135
See id. at 161. The Italian securities regulator is the Commissione Nazionale
per le Società e la Borsa. See Consob, http://www.consob.it/mainen/index.html?
mode=gfx (last visited Dec. 22, 2010).
136
See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 162.
137
See id. at 162–64.
138
See id. at 164. The fictitious bank account was held by Parmalat’s Cayman
Islands subsidiary, Bonlat. See id.
139
Dr. Enrico Bondi was appointed Parmalat’s Extraordinary Bankruptcy
Commissioner. See id. at 162–64.
140
See id. at 168.
141
See id. at 153; Parma Splat—Europe’s Corporate Governance, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 17, 2004, at Special Report (2); Peter Gumbel & Jeff Israely, Enron, Italian
Style, TIME, Jan. 12, 2004, at 53; Weber & Edmondson, supra note 6.
142
See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 165–66.
143
See id. at 167–69.
144
See id. at 168–69.
145
See id. at 168; Alessandra Galloni & David Reilly, Auditor Raised Parmalat
Red Flag, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2004, at A3.
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Agency and Control: Two Theories of Liability

Following news of Parmalat’s fraudulent reporting, lawsuits
quickly followed.146 In August 2004, Parmalat’s administrator
sued the company’s former Italian auditors, as well as the global
accounting firms to which they belonged and their U.S.
affiliates.147 This suit, which was joined by U.S. investors who
had lost billions in Parmalat,148 alleged that the global firms to
which Parmalat’s Italian auditors belonged should be held
secondarily liable for their Italian member firms’ violations of
section 10(b).149 Plaintiffs also sued the global firms and their
U.S. member firms under section 20(a), claiming that they
controlled the Italian firms that had committed the primary
violations of the Securities Exchange Act.150
The global
accounting firms and their U.S. member firms moved to dismiss
the complaint151 and subsequently moved for summary judgment,
but the court rejected these motions, finding triable issues of fact
as to each defendant.152
The Parmalat plaintiffs advanced two theories of liability
against the Deloitte Defendants.153 First, the plaintiffs argued
that the global firm, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (“DTT”), should
be vicariously liable for Deloitte-Italy’s primary violation of
section 10(b) based on a common law theory of agency.154 Second,
the plaintiffs contended that both DTT and Deloitte-U.S. should
be secondarily liable as control persons under a theory that the
DTT controlled Deloitte-Italy and Deloitte-U.S. controlled DTT.155
First addressing the common law agency theory, the court
held that the law required an “agreement between the principal

146

See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
See Luisa Beltran, Parmalat Goes After Former Auditors, CBS
MARKETWATCH.COM (Aug. 18, 2004, 12:25 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
lazards-restructuring-team-readies-for-new-blow-ups.
148
See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
149
See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 449–55.
150
See id. at 455–60.
151
See Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
152
See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 640 F. Supp. 2d 243, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(rejecting Grant Thornton’s motion); Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 460 (rejecting
Deloitte’s motion).
153
The legal claims and key facts are generally the same for the Deloitte
Defendants and the Grant Thornton Defendants. For the sake of clarity, the
following analysis only discusses the claims against the Deloitte Defendants.
154
See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 451–55.
155
See id. at 455–60.
147
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and the agent that the agent will act for the principal, and the
principal retains a degree of control over the agent,” with the
control element typically being the central issue.156 To establish
liability on the part of a secondary party, the agent must have
actual,157 apparent,158 or implied159 authority to act on the
principal’s behalf.160 Once the agency relationship has been
established, the court concluded, the common law principle of
respondeat superior operates to hold the principal liable for the
section 10(b) violation by its agent.161
The court found that the plaintiffs had pled sufficient
evidence of an agency relationship between DTT and DeloitteItaly to expose DTT to vicarious liability for Deloitte-Italy’s
alleged violation of 10(b).162 The court cited the following facts as
evidence that DTT controlled Deloitte-Italy: (1) DTT required
that its member firms use a common audit software; (2) DTT set
documentation policies and quality control standards; (3) DTT
conducted compliance and quality control reviews of its member
firms; (4) DTT retained the right to require that its member
firms accept or reject audit engagements; and (5) DTT provided

156

Id. at 451.
Actual authority “ ‘is created by direct manifestations from the principal to
the agent.’ ” Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, Nos. 00 Civ. 2284(DLC), 00 Civ. 2498(DLC),
2002 WL 826847, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2002) (quoting Reiss v. Société Centrale du
Groupe des Assurances Nationales, 235 F.3d 738, 748 (2d Cir. 2000)).
158
Apparent authority may be “implied from ‘the parties’ words and conduct as
construed in light of the surrounding circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting Riverside
Research Inst. v. KMGA, Inc., 108 A.D.2d 365, 370, 489 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (1st Dep’t
1985)).
159
Implied authority “ ‘is dependent on verbal or other acts by a principal which
reasonably give an appearance of authority’ in a manner that is ‘brought home to the
agent.’ ” Id. (quoting Greene v. Hellman, 51 N.Y.2d 197, 204, 412 N.E.2d 1301, 1306,
433 N.Y.S.2d 75, 80 (1980)).
160
See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 451–52.
161
See id. at 451.
162
See id. at 452–55. In finding that an agency relationship existed, the
Parmalat Court relied on a Florida state court case, Banco Espirito Santo Int’l, Ltd.
v. BDO Int’l, 979 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). The Florida District Court of
Appeals found a triable issue of fact as to whether an agency relationship existed
between the global accounting firm, BDO International, and its U.S. member, BDO
Seidman. See id. at 1032–33. Following remand, the jury deliberated for one hour
before reaching its verdict that the U.S. accounting firm, BDO Seidman, was not an
agent of its global firm and that the global firm did not control its member firm. See
Erik Larson & Sophia Pearson, BDO Cleared of Responsibility for Seidman Verdict,
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 18, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
21070001&sid=acqwPbkZqoWI.
157
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some legal and risk management services its member firms.163
While the court acknowledged that other courts in the Second
Circuit had rejected claims of agency liability against global
accounting firms because their structure did “not demonstrate
control,”164 it buttressed its decision with a single instance in
which DTT resolved a disagreement between Deloitte-Italy and
the Deloitte affiliate in Brazil regarding the proper accounting
treatment for a transaction in the Parmalat audit.165
Turning to the plaintiffs’ second cause of action, “control
person” liability under section 20(a), the Parmalat Court found
that the ability to control the violating party’s actions generally
was sufficient to satisfy the statute.166 The court rejected
defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs must prove that the
global accounting firm actually controlled the transaction at
issue, because the court found this imposed too high a burden on
plaintiffs.167 The court further reduced the plaintiffs’ burden,
finding that the statutory provision that exculpated a defendant
that “acted in good faith” created an affirmative defense and was
not an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.168
As with vicarious liability under 10(b), the court found
sufficient evidence to sustain the section 20(a) claims against
DTT and Deloitte-U.S.169 For DTT, the court relied on the same
analysis it used for vicarious liability under 10(b) to find that
plaintiffs had stated a claim of control over Deloitte-Italy under
20(a).170 For Deloitte-U.S., the court drew a line of connection
from Deloitte-U.S. to DTT to Deloitte-Italy.171 To support this
chain of inferences, the court relied on the fact that DTT shared
some executive staff with Deloitte-U.S., most notably the CEO
and Deloitte-U.S.’s provision of funding and guaranteeing of
financing for DTT.172 In concluding that Deloitte-U.S. controlled

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53.
Id. at 453 & n.63.
See id. at 453–54.
See id. at 454 n.72, 455–56.
See id. at 456.
See id. at 456–57 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006)).
See id. at 458.
See id. at 456–58; supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
See id. at 458–60.
See id. at 458–59
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DTT, the court also relied on the allegation that Deloitte-U.S.
influenced DTT’s decision to sell its consulting business.173
The Parmalat Court’s decision to permit the plaintiffs to
proceed under both vicarious liability and section 20(a) provided
impetus for the accounting firms to resolve the case. In March
2010, the court approved a settlement with the Deloitte and
Grant Thornton defendants.174 Under the agreement, plaintiffs
will receive a total of $15 million from Parmalat’s auditors, with
the Deloitte Defendants providing $8.5 million.175
Grant
Thornton International agreed to settle the claims against it for
$6.5 million, while Grant Thornton U.S. was dismissed with
prejudice from the case and will not face any liability for the
losses allegedly caused by its former Italian affiliate’s audits of
Parmalat.176 The relatively small settlement is due in part to
settlements that plaintiffs had reached with Parmalat’s Italian
auditors and other defendants, but it also reflects the difficult
task that plaintiffs faced in proving that the global and U.S.
firms controlled the Italian auditors.177
Although a settlement has been reached, the Parmalat
Court’s decision highlights the current conflict in securities law
regarding secondary liability: whether section 20(a) provides the
sole basis for private causes of action against secondary actors,
such as affiliated accounting firms, that did not actually commit
a securities violation. The Parmalat Court permitted plaintiffs to
proceed against the accounting firms both under common law
vicarious liability and control person liability under 20(a),178
rejecting the argument that vicarious liability under section 10(b)
is no longer viable in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in

173

See id. at 460.
See Grant McCool, US Judge Approves Parmalat Ex-Auditors Settlement,
REUTERS,
Mar.
11,
2010,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSN1125315520100311?type=marketsNews; see also Stipulation and Agreement
on Settlement at 11, In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(No. 04 MD 1653(LAK)); Andrew Longstreth, Parmalat Shareholders Milk Small
Settlements from Auditors, LAW.COM (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/Pub
Article.jsp?id=1202435772952 (discussing the details of the settlement).
175
See Longstreth, supra note 174.
176
See id.
177
See id. (citing statements by the plaintiffs’ co-lead counsel that there was no
guarantee of proving the global and U.S. accounting firms controlled their Italian
counterparts); see also Chad Bray, Auditors Reach $15M Settlement in Parmalat
Holder Case, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Nov. 19, 2009.
178
See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 451–52, 455–56.
174
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Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc.179 The
court, however, failed to consider that Stoneridge’s holding that
“ ‘the conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the
elements or preconditions for liability’ ” precludes common law
theories of liability under section 10(b).180
III. REJECTING VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF ACTUAL
CONTROL
On three occasions, the Supreme Court has rejected
attempts to impose liability under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act in the absence of a primary violation by the
defendant.181 Nevertheless, lower courts have generally taken an
expansive view of secondary liability under 10(b), particularly in
the area of vicarious liability for violations committed by an
employee or agent.182 These courts have rejected arguments that
control person liability under section 20(a) provides an effective—
and exclusive—means to impose liability on those who control
primary violators of section 10(b), even though the result is that
liability under 20(b) becomes redundant.183 Many courts are
driven to apply vicarious liability under 10(b) because some
federal courts of appeals have imposed too high a burden on
control person liability claims brought under section 20(a) by
requiring culpable participation.184 Rather than applying a
culpable participation standard, which is at odds with the
language of the statute and congressional intent, courts should
179
See id. at 449–51 (discussing Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008)). Subsequent decisions have called into question the
viability of vicarious liability suits under section 10(b). See In re Tronox, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. 09 Civ. 6220(SAS), 2010 WL 2835545, at *8 n.120 (S.D.N.Y. June 28,
2010) (questioning whether claims for vicarious liability can be brought under
§ 10(b) following the Second Circuit’s decision in Pacific Investment Management
Co., LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010)).
180
Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 450 (quoting Stoneridge, 522 U.S. at 158).
181
See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 152–53; Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
182
See Laperriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 526 F.3d 715, 725 & n.21 (11th Cir.
2008) (finding a seven-to-one split among the other courts of appeals in favor of
applying vicarious liability to 10(b)).
183
See, e.g., Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 450–55 (applying common law agency
liability to section 10(b)).
184
See id. at 456 & n.83 (discussing the split among the district courts in the
Second Circuit caused by an unclear standard on culpability); see also supra notes
252–60 and accompanying text).
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apply an actual control of the audit standard to claims of
secondary liability brought against accounting firms for the
alleged wrongdoing of affiliated accounting firms.185
A.

Section 10(b) Does Not Encompass Vicarious Liability Claims

The majority of federal courts of appeals to consider the issue
have concluded that plaintiffs can bring a private cause of action
under section 10(b) premised on common law theories of
These decisions are in tension with
vicarious liability.186
Supreme Court precedent, which rejects a broad view of the
private 10(b) cause of action and focuses on the express
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.187 Furthermore, these
decisions conflict with congressional intent as shown through the
express provision for secondary liability under section 20(a) with
its good faith defense.188 While corporations should not be
permitted to profit from the wrongdoing of their employees
without facing liability, this does not justify imposing secondary
liability on accounting firms for alleged violations by independent
accounting firms in other countries. Rather, the organizational
structure of accounting firms, as well as public policy concerns
about the sustainability of the industry, support a narrow view of
accounting firm liability focused on whether the firm actually
controlled the audit at issue in the litigation.
1.

Supreme Court Precedent and Legislative Intent Do Not
Support Vicarious Liability Under Section 10(b)

In 1933 and 1934, Congress passed major securities reform
litigation to combat the root causes of the stock market crash of

185

See infra Part III.B.2–3.
See Laperriere, 526 F.3d at 725 & n.21. But see In re Tronox, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. 09 Civ. 6220(SAS), 2010 WL 2835545, at *8 n.120 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010).
187
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158–59
(2008); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 191 (1994); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). For a
discussion of pre-Central Bank Supreme Court cases rejecting secondary liability
claims under 10(b), see Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 90–92, 94–98 (1981) (quoted and cited
with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 169, 184,
191); William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. Carman, Respondeat Superior and the
Federal Securities Law: A Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 14–22
(1983).
188
See infra Part III.A.2.
186
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1929.189 To address perceived widespread fraud in securities
transactions, Congress enacted section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits the use of “any
manipulative or deceptive device” in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities.190 Section 20(a), a companion
provision of the Act, imposes liability on any party that directly
or indirectly controls a party that is liable under the Act, unless
the controlling party acted in good faith and did not induce the
violation.191 While the legislative history does not indicate
whether Congress intended section 10(b) to be supplemented by
common law vicarious liability, the existence of a control liability
provision in section 20(a), along with the good faith defense that
is unavailable under the strict liability theories of agency or
respondeat superior, demonstrates Congress’s intent to hold
secondary actors accountable when they have acted in bad
faith.192 This express statement of Congress’s intent is wholly at
odds with the application of common law strict liability principles
to private causes of action under 10(b).193
Each time the Supreme Court has considered a claim of
vicarious or secondary liability under 10(b), it has roundly
rejected it.194 Relying instead on the express terms of the statute,
the Court has consistently limited 10(b) claims to defendants who

189
See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194–96; KING, supra note 55, at 59–61;
Carson, supra note 100, at 265–73. The Securities Act of 1933 applies to direct or
indirect sales of securities by the issuer. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e (West 2011). The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 covers securities transactions in exchanges and
over-the-counter markets. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
190
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
191
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
192
See Carson, supra note 100, at 270–72; Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note
187, at 22–27.
193
See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Controlling Person Liability
Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities
Act, 53 BUS. LAW. 1, 8 (1997).
194
See supra Part I.C.1. At least one commentator has argued that the Supreme
Court has recognized vicarious liability under the Securities Exchange Act in
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). See William H.
Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws—Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common Law Principles and
the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 317 (1988). While the Court in Affiliated
Ute recognized that the bank’s liability was “coextensive” with that of its employees,
406 U.S. at 154, no precedent was cited to support this holding, and the Supreme
Court has never cited Affiliated Ute for the proposition that an employer may be
held vicariously liable under the Securities Exchange Act.
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actually commit a primary violation of the statute.195 For
example, in Ernst & Ernst, the Court correctly found that
Congress’s use of the words “manipulative” and “deceptive”
strongly suggest that 10(b) proscribes only “knowing or
intentional misconduct,” not a negligent failure to act.196 The
Court reiterated this holding in Central Bank, when it properly
rejected attempts to impose secondary liability on those who aid
and abet manipulative or deceptive conduct because 10(b) does
not proscribe aiding and abetting conduct.197 Most recently, in
Stoneridge, the Supreme Court rejected secondary liability under
10(b) packaged as “scheme liability.”198
First, the Court
reiterated its position that the scope of the judicially created
private cause of action under 10(b) is delineated by the text of the
statute alone.199 Second, the Court found that the PSLRA, which
Congress passed in response to Central Bank, modified section
10(b) to further restrict, rather than expand, the 10(b) private
cause of action.200
The primary reason that the Supreme Court has consistently
refused to broaden the private cause of action under 10(b) is that
it was created by judicial decision, not by the statute.201 The
Court has stated that the “decision to extend the cause of action
is for Congress, not for us.”202 As a result, the Court has refused
to expand the scope of 10(b) because of its remedial effect,203
relying instead on provisions of the statute that expanded
governmental enforcement rather than private actions.204
195
See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 187, at 14–22 (contending that “the
Supreme Court has specifically rejected several of the rationales . . . advanced by
appellate courts in upholding a plaintiff’s right to hold the defendants liable under
respondeat superior”).
196
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
197
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 176–77 (1994).
198
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159–64
(2008).
199
See id. at 157.
200
See id. at 162–63.
201
See id.; Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 179–80; Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210.
202
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165.
203
See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199–200; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,
695 (1980) (“[G]eneralized references to the remedial purposes of the securities laws
will not justify reading a provision more broadly than its language and the statutory
scheme reasonably permit.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted));
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (“The invocation of the
‘remedial purposes’ of the 1934 Act is similarly unavailing.”).
204
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165–66.

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1133 (2010)

1162

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1133

Despite the Supreme Court’s consistent position, some courts
have held that plaintiffs can pursue vicarious liability claims
under 10(b), reasoning that liability is based on the relationship
between the defendant and the primary violator, not the
defendant’s conduct.205 In sustaining vicarious liability under
10(b), some district courts206 have relied on appellate court
decisions upholding a corporation’s liability for its employee’s
violation of 10(b) on the grounds that a “corporation can only act
through its employees and agents.”207 This remains the majority
position208 because its supporters believe that without vicarious
liability under 10(b), investment banks, brokerage firms, and
other corporations will escape liability for the misdeeds of their
employees.209 These lower court decisions, however, ignore the
repeated holdings of the Supreme Court that liability under 10(b)
is defined by the defendant’s conduct, not by its relationship with

205

See, e.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 291 n.73 (S.D.N.Y.

2005).
206
See, e.g., id.; In re WorldCom, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2003
WL 21488087, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003).
207
See Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 100–
01 (2d Cir. 2001) (involving allegations that an employee of an investment bank
corporation violated 10(b)). In addition to Suez Equity, some courts that have applied
vicarious liability to 10(b) claims have relied on the Third Circuit’s reasoning in
AT&T, Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
However, AT&T did not address a Securities Act violation, but a violation of the
Lanham (Trademark) Act. Id. at 1430. In that context, the Third Circuit simply
refused to import Central Bank’s holding into federal trademark law, an area never
addressed in Central Bank. See id. (“[W]e do not believe that the [Supreme] Court’s
restrictive reading of the [Securities] Exchange Act impacts on the determination of
the scope of liability under the Lanham Act.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, AT&T is
irrelevant to determining whether vicarious liability claims may be brought under
10(b).
208
See supra note 68. This is not, however, a universal position. Compare
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 386
(5th Cir. 2007) (finding that the Supreme Court “conclusively foreclosed the
application of secondary liability under 10(b)”), with Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at
291 n.73 (finding that Central Bank “does not eliminate corporate defendants’
liability for the misrepresentations or manipulations of their agents”).
209
See generally Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and Judicially
Implementing the Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat Superior
Liability Under Section 10(b), 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1343–96 (1997) (discussing a
number of arguments in favor of retaining vicarious liability under section 10(b),
including the statute’s defining “person” to include a corporation, Congress’s failure
to exclude vicarious liability, and policy considerations, such as promoting greater
control of agents).
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another party.210 Rather than supplementing 10(b) with common
law vicarious liability, lower courts should follow the instruction
of the Supreme Court, which has recognized that section 20(a),
the control person provision, provides the means to impose
liability on secondary actors.211 The Court has relied on the
existence of secondary liability under 20(a) in rejecting secondary
liability under section 10(b).212 In Central Bank, the Supreme
Court admonished lower courts not to take it upon themselves to
graft common law liability principles onto 10(b) when the text of
the statute governs the outer limits of liability.213 As the Court
instructed, the “fact that Congress chose to impose some forms of
secondary liability, but not others, indicates a deliberate
congressional choice with which the courts should not
interfere.”214
2.

Vicarious Liability Under 10(b) Renders 20(a) Redundant

Permitting vicarious liability under section 10(b) violates a
“cardinal principle” of statutory construction because it renders
section 20(a) redundant. One reason courts have been willing to
impose secondary liability under both sections 10(b) and 20(a)
appears to be a lack of distinction between primary and
secondary liability.215 Under a vicarious liability analysis, the
210
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158
(2008) (“The conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the elements or
preconditions for liability . . . .” (emphasis added)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (“When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of
manipulation and deception, . . . we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the
statute to negligent conduct.” (emphasis added)).
211
See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 184 (1994).
212
See id. (“Congress did not overlook secondary liability when it created the
private rights of action in the 1934 Act. Section 20 of the 1934 Act imposes liability
on controlling persons . . . .” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
213
See id. at 183–84.
214
Id. at 184 (emphasis added). The Central Bank dissent recognized that the
Court’s holding “at the very least casts serious doubt . . . on other forms of secondary
liability” other than aiding and abetting. Id. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
Fischel, supra note 187, at 96–98 (cited with approval by the Court in Central Bank,
511 U.S. at 184).
215
See In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). “At the outset, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Central Bank does not amount
to a categorical prohibition on claims against secondary actors such as accountants.”
Id. However, the Supreme Court emphasized in Central Bank that accountants and
others could only be held liable for primary violations of section 10(b) if “all of the
requirements for primary liability . . . are met.” Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.

84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1133 (2010)

1164

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1133

only relevant consideration is whether the primary violation
occurred within the scope of an agency or employment
relationship.216 No consideration of the conduct or good faith of
the control defendant is appropriate, and no fault on the part of
the control defendant is necessary to impose liability.217 The
imposition of common law strict liability, therefore, contradicts
the express language of section 20(a), which provides an
affirmative, good faith defense.218 The application of vicarious
liability also conflicts with the legislative history, which indicates
that Congress did not intend to hold control persons strictly
liable but chose to afford them a good faith defense.219
Nevertheless, lower courts generally have treated vicarious
liability under 10(b) as an alternative to section 20(a) liability,
giving plaintiffs the option of pleading either, or both. Whether a
plaintiff pleads vicarious liability under 10(b) or control liability
under 20(a), the end result is the same: The control defendant is
subject to secondary liability for another party’s primary
violation of the Securities Exchange Act. The only noteworthy
distinction is that a defendant sued under 20(a) enjoys the
protection of the good faith affirmative defense, while a
defendant sued vicariously under common law agency principles
receives no such protection. Given that both approaches provide
the same outcome, no rational plaintiff would ever sue a
secondary actor only under 20(a) because of the risk of losing the
case if the defendant prevails on the good faith defense.

216
See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 187, at 11, 27–28; Kuehnle, supra note
194, at 320 (“One is primarily liable, then, if he or she directly does, alone or with
others, an act prohibited by the statute. Secondary violators are those who, though
they do not perform the act, have responsibility for it through assistance or a
relationship with the primary violator.”).
217
See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 291 n.73 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding that “the principal is held liable on a theory of agency ‘not because it
committed some wrongdoing . . . but because its status merits responsibility for the
tortious actions of its agent’ ” (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve
Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1431 (3d Cir. 1994) (a case involving the Lanham Act)));
Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 187, at 13 (“Once a court determines that liability
may be found under respondeat superior, any discussion of a firm’s duty to supervise
or its negligent actions becomes irrelevant.”); Prentice, supra note 209, at 1332,
1350.
218
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006); see also infra Part III.B.
219
See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 193, at 8–9 (“Legislative history
clearly supports congressional intent . . . to reject a standard of conduct which
imposes strict liability” on secondary actors.).
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When plaintiffs have no rational basis to employ section
20(a), because vicarious liability under 10(b) provides all the
same benefits and more, 20(a) has been made redundant.220 Such
a result is impermissible under the cannons of statutory
construction employed by the Supreme Court, which has
frequently “cautioned against reading a text in a way that makes
part of it redundant.”221 Section 20(a) expresses a strong
congressional intent to impose liability on secondary control
actors, but it also demonstrates an equally strong desire to not
impose liability on controlling parties that have acted in good
faith.222 By incorporating strict liability common law principles
into claims brought under section 10(b), courts have subverted
the will of Congress as evidenced by the affirmative defense in
20(a) and have rejected the Supreme Court’s teachings not to
read section 10(b) in a way that makes 20(a) redundant.
3.

Policy Considerations Support Limiting Section 10(b) to
Primary Violators

Accounting firms occupy a precarious position in the realm of
securities law liability. The work of auditors necessarily involves
the exercise of a significant amount of judgment,223 which leaves
accounting firms open to massive liability based on hindsight.
Shareholders frequently sue a corporation’s auditors after fraud
or other financial misfeasance is disclosed because of the
potential for large recovery and the likelihood that accounting
firms will settle rather than fight the suit.224 As a result,
“[l]itigation-related expenses are a significant component of
auditing firms’ cost structures,”225 with the primary risk coming

220
See Fischel, supra note 187, at 94 n.83. Properly read, the two statutes have
complementary roles: section 10(b) applies to primary violators while section 20(a)
applies to secondary control persons, subject to the limits of the good faith defense.
221
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 669
(2007); see TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of
statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that,
if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.’ ” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))).
222
See infra Part III.B.1.
223
See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 89 (indicating that “[a]udit quality is
often thought to include the experience and technical capability of the auditing firm
partners and staff”).
224
See Mark, supra note 51, at 1106–07.
225
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at II:7.
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from large “big ticket liability” suits.226 When a large corporation
like Enron or Parmalat collapses, accounting firms are subject to
liability for the full market value of investors’ losses, which is
typically many billions of dollars.227 Over the past ten years, the
four largest global accounting firms have collectively paid out
more than $5.86 billion to settle such claims.228 Accounting firms
also face regulatory causes of action and, possibly, criminal
actions when fraud is uncovered.229
For the most part,
accounting firms have no way to insure against the risk posed by
billion-dollar judgments because of the uncertainty regarding the
extent of their potential liability.230
Together with the sheer size of the potential liability they
face, accounting firms’ unique structure cautions against
imposing secondary liability under section 10(b). First, because
global accounting firms are organized as independent national
partnerships, their control over affiliated firms largely consists of
setting common standards and procedures and enforcing
compliance with these procedures.231 A global firm’s disciplinary
power is limited to terminating its relationship with its member
firm, which can continue to practice under a new name.232
Second, state and foreign laws limit an accounting firm’s ability
to control its affiliates by restricting ownership and mandating a
partnership structure.233 Third, the accounting industry is
226

Talley, supra note 62, at 1644.
See id. at 1642 (“Auditors now face enhanced vulnerabilities to liability risks
that—at least according to some—threaten the very viability of the industry as we
know it.”); ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at II:7 (“The largest U.S.
public companies have enormous market capitalization and, if a large cap company
becomes insolvent or suffers a significant diminution in market value, such market
loss often greatly exceeds the total capital of the auditing firm which audited that
company.”).
228
See Tammy Whitehouse, Audit Firms Sure To Face New Litigation, Experts
Say, COMPLIANCE WK., July 22, 2009, available at http://www.complianceweek.com/
blog/whitehouse/2009/07/22/audit-firms-sure-to-face-new-litigation-experts-say/.
229
See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 34; Talley, supra note 62, at 1649.
230
See Talley, supra note 62, at 1642 n.5.
231
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:10; GAO REPORT,
supra note 26, at 8–9.
232
See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 640 F. Supp. 2d 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(describing the powers of the global firm Grant Thornton International as extending
only to “demotion of a member firm to correspondent status, hiring of new partners
for the member firm, termination of existing personnel, and expulsion of the member
firm”).
233
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:10; CENTER FOR
AUDIT QUALITY, supra note 28, at 23 n.5.
227
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currently highly concentrated, with just four global accounting
networks auditing nearly all major auditing publicly held
corporations.234
As a result, the loss of even one global
accounting network to a large civil judgment would likely cause a
significant reduction in corporations’ choice of outside auditors,235
negatively impacting auditor independence and increasing audit
costs.236 Fourth, because U.S. accounting firms are often much
larger than their foreign counterparts, plaintiffs are more likely
to sue the deep-pocketed U.S. firm rather than the less wellfunded local accounting firm that committed the alleged
wrongdoing.237
Some commentators have argued in favor of greater liability
for accounting firms based on a number of factors.238 First,
accounting firms collectively earn billions of dollars each year.239
Second, accounting firms are not seen as being completely
Third, accountants and
transparent in their operations.240
auditors owe a fiduciary duty to investors and the public, which
the Supreme Court has recognized.241 Fourth, global accounting
firms do exercise a significant degree of control over their
member firms in setting standards, monitoring compliance, and
regulating use of the brand name.242 In addition, some have
asked whether the market really would suffer from the loss of
another global accounting firm, since other large accounting
firms and smaller firms could absorb much of its audit work and
its employees.243
234

See supra Part I.A.
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at VIII:3; GAO REPORT,
supra note 26, at 34–35.
236
See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 35–36.
237
Called To Account—The Future of Auditing, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2004.
238
See generally Mark, supra note 51, at 1174–210.
239
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at II:1 (“In 2007, the four
largest global network firms reported, in the aggregate, approximately $90 billion in
total revenues.”).
240
See id. at II:8 (“The largest [accounting] firms provide only limited
information to the investing public about the sources of their revenue, their
governance practices, the amount of their earnings, and their financial condition.”).
241
See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817–18 (1984).
242
See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text. Although strong evidence of
control, these factors have generally been found to be insufficient to establish control
person liability. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
243
See Mark, supra note 51, at 1195–96; Talley supra note 62, at 1691–92
(noting that after the collapse of Arthur Andersen, “displaced employees appeared to
be absorbed by other firms in a relatively orderly way, not only by other large firms,
but also by second-tier accounting firms”).
235
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Nevertheless, secondary liability under section 10(b) is
unnecessary to achieve the policy aims its supporters claim it
protects, and in the context of accounting firm liability, it creates
much harm.
Secondary liability under section 10(b) is
unnecessary to hold an accounting firm liable as an employer or
as a control person because a control defendant sued under
section 20(a) must establish that it took “some precautionary
measures . . . to prevent an injury caused by an employee” to
avoid liability.244 To establish good faith, an accounting firm
sued as a control defendant may be required to show that it
“maintain[ed] an adequate system of internal control, and that
[it] maintain[ed] the system in a diligent manner.”245 While
supervisory liability may not be absolute, plaintiffs can establish
liability on the part of a control defendant by showing a negligent
failure to supervise or control.246
This is hardly an
insurmountable hurdle. In addition, the Supreme Court has
recognized that secondary actors remain subject to primary
liability for their own violations of 10(b).247 In sum, the structure
of global accounting firms, the highly concentrated nature of the
industry, and the implications for auditor independence if a
global firm were to collapse under a large civil judgment all
caution against imposing secondary liability outside the
statutory limits created by Congress.248
B.

Section 20(a) Liability Should Be Limited to Firms That
Actually Controlled the Audit

Having established that section 20(a) is the proper vehicle
for imposing secondary liability, the next issue is determining
244

Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979).
Id.
246
See id.
247
See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (“Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank,
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission)
on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator
under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5
are met.”).
248
The adverse impacts caused by the collapse of a large global accounting firm,
such as decreased competition, reduced auditor independence, and increased audit
costs, are widely recognized. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 32–36;
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big To Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need
To Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1700–02
(2006). See generally Talley, supra note 62.
245
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what standard of control should be applied. In 20(a), Congress
sought to impose liability on “[e]very person who, directly or
indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this
chapter” of the Act, unless the control defendant acted in good
faith and did not induce the violation.249 Properly understood
within the context of the legislative history, the good faith
exception should be read as an affirmative defense, not as an
element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.250 Additionally, the
standard of control for secondary liability of accounting firms for
audits performed by affiliated accounting firms should be an
actual control of the audit standard, not a general right to control
standard.251
1.

Culpable Participation Is an Affirmative Defense

The phrase “culpable participation” does not appear in the
text of section 20(a).252
The federal courts of appeals,
nevertheless, cannot agree on whether the plaintiff must
establish culpability as an element of the cause of action, or
whether the defendant must raise a lack of culpability as an
affirmative defense.253 The Second Circuit was the first to
require that plaintiffs establish that a control defendant was a
culpable participant in the underlying violation of the Securities
Exchange Act.254 The Second Circuit reasoned that the text and
the legislative history offered “no evidence” that Congress
intended that anyone should be “an insurer against false or
misleading statements made non-negligently or in good faith.”255
Rather than stick with this simple, yet implausible standard,
the Second Circuit’s decisions applying culpable participation
have hopelessly confused the issue. In Marbury Management,
Inc. v. Kohn, the court backed away from requiring plaintiff to
prove the control person’s culpability, reasoning that “[d]ifferent
249

15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006).
See infra Part III.B.1.
251
See infra Part III.B.2.
252
See 15 U.S.C. 78t(a).
253
See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “Erisa”
Litig.), Nos. MDL-1446, Civ.A. H-01-3624, 2003 WL 230688, at *9–10 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
28, 2003) (discussing the circuit split); Rieger v. Drabinsky (In re Livent, Inc.,
Noteholders Sec. Litig.), 151 F. Supp. 2d 371, 413–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing the
split both among the federal courts of appeals and within the Second Circuit).
254
See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973).
255
Id. (quoting Kohn v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 280 (3d Cir.
1972)).
250
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considerations control the application of respondeat superior
principles.”256
Despite this statement, the Second Circuit
reversed course again in Securities & Exchange Commission v.
First Jersey Securities, Inc., reiterating its earlier holding that
plaintiffs must show that the control defendant was “in some
meaningful sense [a] culpable participant[ ] in the fraud.”257
Determined not to leave well-enough alone, in the very next
paragraph of First Jersey, the court seemed to shift the burden
back to the defendant, stating that “[o]nce the plaintiff makes out
a prima facie case of section 20(a) liability, the burden shifts to
the defendant to show that he acted in good faith and that he did
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the
violation.”258 The Second Circuit has repeatedly readopted its
First Jersey test without shedding any light as to which party
bears the burden of culpability.259
Not surprisingly, this schizophrenic approach has resulted in
differing standards being applied by the district courts within the
Second Circuit.260 The court in Parmalat sided with the majority
of circuits outside the Second Circuit, holding that lack of
culpability is a good faith defense that the accounting firm
defendants can raise, not an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie
case.261 Other district courts applying 20(a) have required
plaintiffs to prove a control defendant’s culpable participation.262
Still other courts have avoided the issue entirely, deciding claims
256

629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Gordon v.
Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1085 (2d Cir. 1974)).
258
Id. at 1473 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
259
See, e.g., Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87,
101–02 (2d Cir. 2001); Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715, 720 (2d Cir. 1998); First
Jersey, 101 F.3d at 1472–73.
260
See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 456 n.83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(discussing the split); Jeff G. Hammel & Robert J. Malionek, Elusive Standard To
Plead § 20(a) Control Person Liability, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 5, 2007, at 4.
261
See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 456.
262
See Lapin v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 221, 245–46
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 433, 489–90 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); see also Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., No. 09 Civ. 0118(VM), 2010 WL
3341636, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2010) (treating control as analogous to culpable
participation). As discussed infra Part III.B.2, a control defendant may have actual
control of the primary violator without being a culpable participant in the violation.
The distinction between control and culpability—or scienter—is critical because, as
discussed in this Section, culpable participation is an affirmative defense that the
control defendant may raise, whereas control is an element of a prima facie section
20(a) claim, which the plaintiff must establish. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006).
257
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under 20(a) on the more narrow issue of whether the 20(a)
defendant had “control” of the party that committed the actual
violation.263
The language of the statute indicates that lack of culpability
is an affirmative defense to be raised by the alleged controlling
party. Structurally, the elements of lack of culpability, good
faith, and an absence of inducement appear after the main part
of the statute and are separated by a comma and the word
“unless.”264 A nearly identical exculpatory clause was added to
section 15, an analogous control person provision of the
Securities Act of 1933, to soften the imposition of strict liability
by allowing for a defense of good faith.265 In addition, the
wording that Congress chose, “unless the controlling person acted
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act,”
more naturally reads as an affirmative defense than as an
element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.266 Had Congress wanted
to include culpability as part of the prima facie case under 20(a),
it could have required plaintiffs to show “bad faith and
inducement in the violative acts” by the controlling person.267
Despite the continuing confusion wrought by the Second Circuit’s
bifurcated test, the good faith and absence of inducement
elements of section 20(a) are best treated as an affirmative
defense that accounting firms and other control defendants may
raise on a motion to dismiss.268

263

See In re Asia Pulp & Paper Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 391, 395–96
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
264
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a); see Kuehnle, supra note 194, at 364; Lowenfels &
Bromberg, supra note 193, at 3–7.
265
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.27 (1976) (indicating
that Congress amended section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, a corollary provision
to section 20(a), to include a good faith defense as it had done with 20(a)); Fischel,
supra note 187, at 98–99 (stating that section 15, as originally passed in 1933,
imposed strict liability on control persons but that Congress amended the law in
1934 to include the same good faith defense as in section 20(a) to address concerns
that strict liability would impose liability on nonculpable parties); Prentice, supra
note 209, at 1404–05.
266
See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 193, at 6–7.
267
See id.
268
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
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The Proper Standard of Control Is Actual Control of the
Audit

Like the split over culpable participation, the meaning of
“control” under section 20(a) is a source of much debate.
Congress did not define “control” in the Act. Some courts,
including the Second Circuit, have applied the definition of
“control” in the SEC’s regulations, which permits liability based
on the power or right to control generally the party that
committed the primary violation, rather than the application of
actual control.269 The Parmalat Court similarly applied this
power to control standard.270 While the SEC’s regulations may be
considered in defining “control” under 20(a), they are not
dispositive. Rather, the Supreme Court has rejected the agency’s
interpretation in other contexts where that interpretation was
broader than the statutory language.271 Use of a broad agency
interpretation of “control” also fails to take account of the
Supreme Court’s consistently narrow reading of the private
causes of action under the Securities Exchange Act in
conformance with the express language of the statute.272
Other courts have followed the Eighth Circuit’s standard,
which requires actual control over the primary violator’s general
activities and the power to control the specific transaction at
issue in the litigation.273 This standard more closely addresses
the central issue in secondary liability claims brought under
20(a): whether the control person defendant could or did control
the specific act that allegedly violated the Securities Exchange
Act. The Eighth Circuit’s standard, however, is undermined by
the fact that it was developed within case law that treated
section 10(b) as a broad remedial statute,274 a view that the

269
See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472–73 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“Control over a primary violator may be established by showing that the defendant
possessed ‘the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies
of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or
otherwise.’ ” (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2010))).
270
See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
271
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212–14 (1976) (rejecting the
SEC’s interpretation of the term “manipulative” in 10(b) as it included negligent
conduct, and noting that the agency’s power extends only to giving effect to
Congress’s intent, not making law).
272
See supra Part III.A.1.
273
See Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985).
274
See id. at 630 (citing Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967)).
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Supreme Court has expressly rejected.275 As a result, the Eighth
Circuit’s standard is in doubt and subject to challenge.
The better reasoned decisions on “control” chart a middle
course. Applying a pragmatic approach, these courts have
applied a standard of “actual control of the transactions in
question.”276 In light of the limits imposed by the statute, which
the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, this standard
considers the relationship between the control person and the
primary violator with respect to the alleged violation, rather than
considering their relationship generally. As such, the standard
affirms the often-stated principle that the “mere existence of a
parent/subsidiary relationship may be an insufficient basis from
which to infer control.”277 Similarly, this standard does not
require a showing of the control person’s scienter, as is required
by the decisions of courts that require that the plaintiff establish
culpable participation by the control person.278 This standard,
therefore, balances the need to hold those who control—or should
control—primary violators accountable, while not reading section
20(a) in such an overly broad manner that it conflicts with
Congress’s intent to limit liability for control persons.
While the actual control of the transaction standard is more
narrowly focused, by no means does it provide blanket immunity
for control person defendants. Rather, control persons still face
liability for failing to act in good faith when they actually control
the primary violator.279 A control defendant, therefore, may be
held liable under 20(a) for negligently failing to supervise or
control an employee or agent. The control defendant is, thus, not

275
See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199–200.
276
Ross v. Bolton, No. 83 CIV. 8244 (WK), 1989 WL 80428, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
4, 1989), vacated on other grounds by No. 83 CIV. 8244 (WK), 1989 WL 80425
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1989) (reversing an erroneous dismissal of common law fraud
claims for jurisdictional reasons); see In re Tronox, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ.
6220(SAS), 2010 WL 2835545, at *14 n.198 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010); In re Global
Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 910(GEL), 2005 WL 1875445, at *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2005) (applying the standard to section 15 of the Securities Act
(15 U.S.C. § 77o) an analogous control person statute to section 20(a)).
277
Global Crossing, 2005 WL 1875445, at *4.
278
See Tronox, 2010 WL 2835545, at *15 (rejecting argument that plaintiff must
establish culpable participation).
279
See supra Part III.B.1.
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vicariously liable for another’s primary violation but is held
secondarily liable for its failure to control the transaction at issue
in good faith.
This actual control of the transaction standard has been
successfully applied by courts in considering section 20(a) claims.
For example, in Global Crossing, the court refused to dismiss a
secondary liability claim brought against an investment bank
under 20(a) where the entity that had committed the primary
violation of 10(b) was a “wholly owned subsidiary” of the parent
company.280 The Global Crossing Court concluded that the
parent company actually controlled the party that had committed
the securities violation because “the directors of both
corporations were interchangeable” and the parent company had
“direct involvement in the day-to-day operations” of its
subsidiary and, presumably, could have prevented the violation
had the parent acted in good faith.281
The actual control of the transaction standard has also been
applied to claims of secondary liability against accounting firms.
For example, in In re Lernout & Hauspie Securities Litigation,
the district court applied this standard by examining what role
each accounting firm played with regard to the alleged securities
violations.282
Investors in a Belgian speech technology
corporation alleged 10(b) and 20(a) violations by KPMG Belgium,
the corporation’s auditors, as well as KPMG International—the
global firm—and the KPMG member firms in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Singapore.283 First addressing primary
liability, the court refused to dismiss the 10(b) claims against
KPMG Belgium because it had actually performed the audits and
had signed off on the speech company’s financial reports.284 The
court also rejected KPMG U.S.’s motion to dismiss because the
U.S. firm’s partners had played “a significant role in drafting the
financial statements and in conducting the audit.”285 By contrast,
the court dismissed the claims against KPMG UK and KPMG
Singapore on the grounds that their having reviewed audits and
commented on documents was insufficient to trigger primary

280
281
282
283
284
285

Global Crossing, 2005 WL 1875445, at *4.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
230 F. Supp. 2d 152, 175–76 (D. Mass. 2002).
See id. at 156–57.
See id. at 163–64.
Id. at 166.
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liability under Central Bank.286 Turning to secondary liability,
the court rejected section 20(a) claims against KPMG
International, KPMG U.S., and KPMG UK on the grounds that
there was “no evidence that KPMG U.S. or KPMG UK ever
actually exercised control over KPMG Belgium in the issuance of
audit reports.”287
The Lernout & Hauspie Court conducted a proper analysis of
whether each accounting firm was actually involved in the audit
at issue in the litigation. Where the Belgian and U.S. firms were
substantially involved in preparing the audit reports alleged to
be deceptive, the court refused to dismiss the claims based on
10(b) primary liability.288 With regard to secondary liability
under 20(a), however, the court rejected the control liability
claims because the plaintiffs had failed to establish that any
KPMG entity had actually controlled KPMG Belgium for the
purpose of the particular audit at issue.289
3.

The Actual Control of the Audit Standard Provides an
Effective Means of Reaching Control Defendants

The actual control of the audit standard is particularly
useful for analyzing the Parmalat plaintiffs’ secondary liability
claims against the Deloitte Defendants. In Parmalat, DeloitteItaly was alleged to have committed the primary violation of
10(b) by either discovering and failing to report, or recklessly
ignoring, the fraud committed by Parmalat’s officers.290 DTT, the
global firm, was alleged to have controlled the Parmalat audit by
arbitrating the dispute between Deloitte-Italy and Deloitte-Brazil
at the center of the audit.291 Under the analysis undertaken in
Lernout & Hauspie and Global Crossing, this intervention by
DTT into the particular Parmalat audit at issue in the litigation
likely raises an issue of fact as to whether the global firm
actually controlled Deloitte-Italy for the purposes of that
particular audit. Application of the actual control of the audit

286
287
288
289
290
291
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standard would, thus, result in the same outcome with regard to
secondary liability claims against DTT as the Parmalat Court’s
analysis.292
With regard to Deloitte-U.S., however, no facts indicate that
it actually controlled any audit of Parmalat. Plaintiffs alleged,
and the court relied on, the fact that Deloitte-U.S. and DTT
shared some executives, Deloitte-U.S. guaranteed loans for its
global firm, and Deloitte-U.S. persuaded the global firm to sell its
consulting business.293 None of these allegations demonstrates
any actual control by Deloitte-U.S. of DTT or Deloitte-Italy for
the purposes of the audit at issue in the litigation. Under the
actual control of the audit standard, Deloitte-U.S. could not be
held secondarily liable because there was no evidence that it
actually controlled another party involved in the auditing of
Parmalat.
Imposing liability only on those firms that actually
controlled a primary violator has numerous advantages. First,
by limiting liability to those entities that actually controlled the
audit, the actual control of the audit standard meaningfully
addresses the systemic risk posed by the loss of a major global
accounting network when a rogue member acts outside of the
legitimate control that the global firm had over the member. On
the other hand, accounting firms that actually controlled an
audit cannot escape liability if they failed to control or supervise
in good faith. Second, the standard recognizes and respects the
unique organizational structure of accounting firms by not
conflating independent national partnerships and their global
network entity into a single persona.
Respecting the
independent partnership structure of national accounting firms
is important because a third party’s perception is not a basis for
measuring liability.294
While this standard may limit an
investor’s recovery to the entities that were actually involved in
or controlled the audit, courts routinely limit investors’ recovery
against other defendants, such as boards of directors, by applying
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a similar “active control” standard.295 Third, by focusing the
secondary liability analysis on the entity that actually controlled
the audit, this standard properly correlates liability with actual
control of the actions that gave rise to the primary violation.
Such a result is important to promote and protect honest capital
markets without subjecting accounting firms to the threat of
massive civil liability.
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court expressed its concern
that excessive secondary liability “exacts costs that may disserve
the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in the securities
markets,”296 resulting in more harm than good to the securities
marketplace as a whole. The investing public will ultimately be
disserved by the imposition of excessive secondary liability on
accounting firms. As the example of Arthur Andersen vividly
shows, the loss of a large global accounting firm will likely result
in fewer choices for corporations, fewer safeguards on auditor
independence, and fewer sources of vital financial information for
the investing public.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has frequently stated that the private
cause of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 must be limited to the express conduct proscribed by
Congress in the Act. Congress has rejected imposing secondary
liability through 10(b), choosing instead to rely on section 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act, which imposes liability on those
who control a primary violator, subject to a good faith defense.
The court in In re Parmalat Securities Litigation rejected the
holding of the Supreme Court and congressional intent when it
permitted plaintiffs to sue two global accounting firms and two
U.S. accounting firms under a vicarious liability theory of 10(b).
Such an approach is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent
and congressional intent as evidenced by the inclusion of the
good faith defense in section 20(a), and it is antithetical to the
notion of holding wrongdoers accountable.
Because of their size, their role in auditing public companies’
financial reports, and their global network structure, large
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accounting firms are uniquely susceptible to the harm wrought
by imposing strict secondary liability under 10(b). The loss of a
large global accounting firm to a private securities claim would
have major implications for auditor independence and would
likely reduce public companies’ options regarding their outside
auditors, while simultaneously increasing public company audit
fees. The solution proposed in this Note, that global accounting
firms should only face secondary liability under section 20(a)
when they have actually controlled the audit, balances the need
to hold accounting firms accountable for their own actions, while
enabling them to limit liability within the realistic boundaries of
control that they have over affiliated accounting firms.

